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Jan Woleński
AN ABSTRACT APPROACH TO BIVALENCE∗
Abstract. This paper outlines an approach to the principle of bivalence
based on very general, but still elementary, semantic considerations. The
principle of bivalence states that (a) “every sentence is either true or false”.
Clearly, some logics are bivalent while others are not. A more general
formulation of (a) uses the concept of designated and non-designated logical
values and is captured by (b) “every sentence is either designated or non-
designated”. Yet this formulation seems trivial, because the concept of
non-designated value is negative. In order to reﬁne the analysis, the class
of anti-designated values has been distinguished. The non-trivial version
of the principle of bivalence is expressed by (c) “every sentence is either
designated or anti-designated”. The last part of the paper mentions some
extralogical reasons for considering the principle of bivalence with truth
being a designated value as intimately connected to human thinking and
behavior.
Keywords: logic; logical value; truth; falsehood; designated; non-designated;
anti-designated.
The principle of bivalence is usually expressed as the following statement
(“either or” expresses the exclusive disjunction)
(1) every sentence is either true or false.
Any logic based on (1) is called two-valued or classical. Its traditional
importance as the very foundation of formal logic consists in its relation
to the so-called highest (the most fundamental) laws of thought. In the
framework of classical metalogic, (1) is equivalent to the conjunction of
∗ This paper is a continuation of my earlier writings, namely Woleński 1998,
Woleński 2004. In fact, my approach is not the most abstract as compared with
account oﬀered in Shramko and Wansing 2011.
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two other basic rules of thought, namely the metalogical principle of
excluded middle
(2) every sentence is true or false;
and the metalogical principle of non-contradiction
(3) no sentence is both true and false.
The adjectives “true” and “false” in (1), (2) and (3) are just metalogical
(i. e. they belong to metalanguage and as such must be sharply distin-
guished from theorems A∨¬A,¬(A∧¬A) and (A∨¬A)∧¬(A∧¬A) that
is, theorems of propositional calculus formulated in the object-language
of logic. Jan Łukasiewicz was perhaps the ﬁrst logician who observed
that (1) is metalogical (see Łukasiewicz 1930).1 It is important to see
that the equivalence
(4) (1)⇔ (2) ∧ (3)
holds for classical logic only.2
A very general semantic approach to logic consists in adopting some
logical values as designated and some as non-designated. Intuitively
speaking, if a formula A always has a designated value as its logical value
it is a theorem of a given logic. Further, I will refer to sentences having
designated values as designated sentences and to sentences having non-
designated values as undesignated sentences. Assume that a function
val (a valuation function) from L being a set of sentences to a set V of
logical values is deﬁned. There are three case (“card” is the abbreviation
for “cardinality”):
(5) card(V) = 0; no A is a theorem;
(6) card(V) = 1; all A’s are theorems (a given logic is inconsistent);
(7) card(V) ­ 2; some A’s are theorems, some A’s are not theorems.
Let D be a set of designated values. A logic Lg is consistent if
card(V) > card(D) (a necessary condition). Moreover, if A is not a the-
orem, ¬A is contradictory (absolutely or relatively, depending whether
1 See Betti 2001 for a discussion of Łukasiewicz’s views on (1).
2 See Béziau 2004 for a discussion of relations of various logics to (1), (2) and
(3). I will discuss his suggestions in a special digression a the end of this paper.
Russell and Cohn 2012 (a selection of papers from Wikipedia) provide a useful survey
of problems related to the principle of bivalence.
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the issue concerns pure logic or extralogical theories). In the case of a
complete logic, A is contradictory iﬀ A is always non-designated.
Clearly, (1) displays the minimal situation where we have exactly
two values. It is normally assumed that truth is designated and falsity
is non-designated. On these grounds, A is a tautology iﬀ A is true
for all valuations, and a counter-tautology iﬀ A is counted as false by
all valuations. On the other hand, dual logic (and other similar con-
structions) designates falsehood. This shows that designating truth is
based on some pragmatic assumptions even in the most popular case
of two-valued logic with truth as the designated value. Anyway, the
sets of designated and non-designated values are mutually exclusive in
any valuation. Moreover, both sets exhaust V (for simplicity sake, I
consider truth-value gaps as logical values in this context). And the
division of logical values into designated and non-designated forms the
logical division in the traditional understanding (see Greniewski 1970; I
skip the diﬀerence between the bivalentists and the pseudo-bivalentists
introduced by this author). The problem of stability of having deﬁnite
logical values (the question whether sentences change their values, for
instance, in the course of time or dependently on the region of space
in which facts described by the sentences in question occur) is more
complex and I will omit it here.
On the other hand, there is no a priori reason to restrict V to two




where particular points have the following interpretation: α – TA, β
– T(¬A), γ – ¬T (¬A), ¬T(A). We have the following dependencies
(analogical to the relations between modalities or categorical sentences):
(8) α⇒ γ (truth of A implies truth of non-truth of ¬A is true);
(9) β ⇒ δ (truth of ¬A implies non-truth of A);
(10) ¬(α ∧ β) (truth of A and truth of ¬A are contraries);
(11) γ ∨ δ (non-truth of ¬A and non-truth of A are complementarities);
(12) α⇔ ¬δ (truth of A and non-truth of A are contradictories);
(13) β ⇔ ¬γ (truth of ¬A and non-truth of ¬A are contradictories).
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There is, however, a question where falsehood should be located in the
diagram (S1) (the formula FA abbreviates “it is false that A” or “A is
false”; I regard the operator and the predicative formulation as express-
ing the same proposition). There are two possibilities, namely to place
FA either at the point β or at the point δ. The ﬁrst choice equates FA
with T(¬A), while the second decision identiﬁes FA with ¬TA. In fact,
(1) assumes that FA, T¬A and ¬TA are equivalent. To put it formally
we have the following equivalences
(14) (a) T¬A⇔ ¬TA;
(b) FA⇔ T¬A (or ¬TA).
This a tacit assumption of the traditional principle of bivalence.
However, (S1), unless (14) is accepted, does not preclude that there






Additional points ν and µ have the reading as respectively “A is either
true or false” and “A is neither true not false” provided that falsehood
is located at the point β; this choice seems the most intuitive from the
general point of view. If (14) is accepted, (S2) becomes reducible to the
triangle determined by the points αβν and we can universally general-
ize ν. This move gives
(15) ∀A(T(A) ∨ F(A),
that is (1). Clearly, the principle of bivalence in this construction is not
a necessary (analytic, metalogically tautological) statement, because it
must be justiﬁed by stipulations recorded in (14); the mentioned re-
duction fails, if (14) is rejected. This observation immediately supports
Łukasiewicz’s view that the principle of bivalence goes beyond purely
logical reasons. And what about the point µ, if (14) is rejected? There
are several interpretative possibilities, for instance, (a) to admit the
existence of truth-value gaps (sentences devoid of logical values; some
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logicians point out that the Liar sentence is gappy); (b) to allow other
logical values than T and F, or (c) to introduce fuzziness. Such solutions
lead to various reforms of classical logic, for instance, by introducing
many-valued logic, logic with truth-value gaps or systems formalizing
fuzzy (inexact, rough) concepts. The details of such constructions are
fairly complicated. For example, fuzzy logic is frequently considered as
a special kind of many-valued logic. We can also regard the gappiness
as a separate logical value (this pragmatic solution was adopted above
for simplicity. My further considerations are restricted to (b), except for
some illustrations. It is suﬃcient to consider the three-valued system
with T as the designated value.3
It is possible to interpret (S1) and (S2) by replacing T by D. In
this context D refers to a designated value, not to the set of designated
values. Thus, the formula DA means “it is designated that A”, “A
is designate” or “A is a designated sentence”. We can formulate the
principle of bivalence as:
(16) ∀A(D(A) ∨ ¬D(A),
which expresses the proposition that (every sentences is designated or
non-designated.4 For instance, every sentence is true or (false or neutral),
every sentence is either true or (false or gappy). However, (16) seems
trivial, although it is universally valid, according to the logic of general-
ized logical squares (see Woleński 2008 for a more extensive examination
of such diagrams). In particular, the category of non-designated items is
ambiguous or heterogenic, because it covers falsehoods and neutralities
(or gappy sentences). In fact, this solution is too easy, because if we
have a given non-void universe U consisting of three (or more) mutually
exclusive sets X , Y , Z, that is, U = X ∪ Y ∪ Z, it is possible to form
the setX ′ = Y ∪ Z and transform the initial equality into U = X ∪X ′;
the symbol X ′ refers to the complement of X .
In order to reﬁne the picture, we can divide non-designated sentences
into anti-designated (Rescher 1969, Malinowski 1993, Gottwald 2001,
Shramko, Wansing 2011), DA and simply non-designated DS. The rule
is that if DA(A), then DS(A), but not conversely. Moreover, D(A) and
DA(A) are contraries, but D(A) and DS(A)  contradictories. Simply
3 Special problems are connected with paraconsistent logic. See Digression at the
end of this paper.
4 This version occurs in Kotarbiński 1913.
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non-designated sentences can have designated values in some models
and non-designated values in other models. Having these dependencies
we can formulate a non-trivial generalized version of the principle of
bivalence as:
(17) ∀A(D(A) ∨D(¬A),
which says that every sentence is either designated or anti-designated.
Clearly, (15) (and, a fortiori, (1)) becomes a special case of (17), if T and
F are admitted as the only logical values and truth is designated, but
falsehood functions as anti-designated. Moreover, there is no diﬀerence
between being anti-designated and non-designated for the latter. On
the other hand, (17) also holds if F serves as the designated value (dual
logic). Clearly, the principle (17) is not-tautological, because it is false
in some metalogics.
If T is designated, its behavior is governed by the T-scheme
(18) TA⇔ A,







The points κ and λ refer to A and ¬A, respectively. Although
(19) D(A)⇒ A,
holds for any designated value, because if it is true that A is designated,
A represents its designated value, its converse generally fails. In fact, if
a sentence A represents a value v, it does not mean that it is designated.
For instance, if val ascribes the neutrality value n to A in the three-
valued system of Łukasiewicz with T as designated, we still have that
DA⇔ A, but n(A) does not imply DA.
The above analysis suggests that Tarski had a good intuition when he
characterized the concept of truth by applying T-equivalences. Proposi-
tional calculus is the simplest case of logic. We can introduce truth and
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falsehood as unary connectives by equations (1, 0 refer to values of the
function val)
(20) v(TA) = 1 iﬀ v(A) = 1; otherwise v(A) = 0.
These equations as well as earlier observations, however simple and per-
haps even trivial, are interesting for at least four reasons. Firstly, they
show why (1) is frequently confused with the law of excluded middle. In
fact, (20) justiﬁes the reduction of TA∨¬TA (or TA∨T¬A or TA∨FA)
to A∨¬A. Yet this is only a partial success, because if we move to pred-
icate calculus, it turns out that introducing “it is true” as a monadic
connective does not suﬃce as the foundation of semantics and the full-
blooded truth-deﬁnition based on the concept of satisfaction must be
employed. Secondly, (20) additionally explains why (S2) and (S3) cannot
be reduced to the triangle αβν in the case of admitting neutralities or
truth-value gaps. Thirdly, considerations about the T-scheme show that
T-equivalences are not longer logical tautologies beyond propositional
calculus (see Woleński 2008a for further arguments). Fourthly, (16),
(17) and (20) contribute to an analysis of the Suszko Thesis (see Suszko
1977, see also Woleński 2009 and Caleiro, Carnielli, Coniglio and Marcos
2007; while I am skeptical about Suszko’s thesis, the Brazillian authors
defend it), according to which every logic is bivalent. More speciﬁcally,
the Suszko Thesis distinguishes logical values (T,F) and algebraic values
(for instance, neutralities in three-valued logic). The simplest argument
saying that this distinction is conventional consists in pointing out that
every logic can be made bivalent by (16), but not by (17). In other
words and on purely logical grounds, the Suszko Thesis is problematic
even if we replace T by D. In fact, it is trivial for D and DS, but not
for D and DA, although some abstract algebraic constructions somehow
“de-trivialize” the problem. Yet it is dubious whether they remain inside
logic.
The formula (17) holds for any two-valued case (the paraconsistent
case will be considered separately below), for instance, when F serves as
the designated value. Yet logical investigations much favor (15), partic-
ularly in metalogic. Moreover, metalogical studies are based on classi-
cal logic even if they pertain to non-classical systems. Although there
are various attempts to execute non-classical metalogic, the results are
fragmentary and limited in their applications. For instance, important
metatheorems concerning intuitionistic logic have no proofs by which
would use methods accepted by the intuitionsts; the completeness the-
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orem for intuitionistic predicate calculus is a very spectacular example
in this respect. In fact, no general metatheory of logic based on non-
classical logic is available. Although this conclusion has the status of
an empirical generalization, it suggests that non-classical logics arise
when some reﬁnements of classical logic help to shed some light on spe-
ciﬁc problems (constructive proofs, fuzziness, gaps, future contingents,
paradoxes, quantum mechanics, etc.). Anyway, the truth-talk has a
privileged status in metalogic and there is nothing to indicate that the
situation will change. For example, logicians speak about truth-functions
although the label “falsehood-functions” appears as fully legitimate from
the theoretical point of view.
What are the reasons for seeing bivalence as basic and truth as desig-
nated? Apart from pragmatic motives pointed out in the last paragraph,
we can list the following circumstances (I restrict myself to a stock of
some factors without entering into details; the list below is nothing more
than a body of speculative suggestions):
(a) Truth represents facts, but falsehood indicates the lack of facts. Peo-
ple are more interested in facts than in the absence of facts (this point
was made by Jerzy Perzanowski in one of our discussions about the
concept of truth;
(b) Spatial and temporal oppositions (symmetric or not): left–right,
bottom–top, earlier–later, back–front, outer–inner;
(c) Biological oppositions: life–death;
(d) Motorical oppositions: active–passive;
(e) Other distinctions: having something–having nothing, having all (in
some collection)–having not-all; modal contrasts and dualities diﬀer-
ences in skills, utilities, duties, values, attitudes, etc., for instance,
duty–right or useful–non-useful. Observe that some oppositions in-
volve positive and negative contrasts, while other are based on the
distinction between the positive and the privative;
(f) Binary rhythms;
(g) Sensual contrasts: dark–bright, loud–silent, colorful–colorless;
(h) The structure of double helix;
(i) Binary character of genetic codes;
(j) 1-0 nature of information;
(k) the belief that preserving truth help protecting information, but pre-
serving falsehood is a “measure” of information–dispersion;
(l) The dual behavior of many quantiﬁers in the natural language.
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For these and presumably many other reasons, logic acting as the frame-
work of human thinking in a notoriously contrastive environment seems
to require a minimal world as its ontological counterpart and this is the
world with two items, i.e. logical values. For pragmatic reasons, one
component was called Truth and the other was dubbed Falsehood. Let
me ﬁnish with an anecdote. Several years ago, perhaps at the beginning
of the 1970s, Roman Suszko delivered a talk on Non-Fregean logic. He
argued that the Frege axiom asserting that all true propositions refer to
one object, namely the True, and all false propositions denote the False
as their very reference, is not intuitive and should be rejected. According
to Suszko, propositions refer to situations and we know that there are
many situations. In the discussion held after the talk, Andrzej Wroński
remarked that the logical world should be as limited as possible, that
is, to two items. Clearly, (7) shows the minimal furniture of the logical
reality. Although the principle of bivalence with T as the designated
value bears no stamp of logical necessity, we can give several empirical
reasons to support it.
A digression
Jean-Yves Béziau (see Béziau 2004) derives the principle of bivalence
from the following statements (I use my terminology):
(i) The set of logical values is limited to two values;
(ii) These truth-values are truth and falsehood;
(iii) Val is a function;
(iv) Val is a total function.
The points (i)–(iv) are summarized in one statement (Béziau 2004, p. 74):
The evaluation relation is a total function whose domain is the set of
propositions and the codomain is a set of truth-values, true and false.
Clearly, (i) excludes many-valueness, (ii) identiﬁes truth-values, (iii)
states the standard property of val and (iv) excludes truth-value gaps.
Béziau’s main intention is to show that (1) should not be identiﬁes
with the conjunction of (2) and (3), because, on one hand, we have a
bivalent semantics for logic without the principle of excluded middle,
and, on the other hand, there is a bivalent semantics, for logic without
the principle of non-contradiction. Béziau’s makes several observations,
for instance, he says (p. 76) that bivalence “reappears at another level” in
many-valued logic, namely as the principle expressed by (16). However,
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as I pointed out, this is quite trivial version of (1) as compared with (17).
Using Béziau’s terminology, (16) obeys the principle of bivaluation, but
not the principle of bivalence. Thus, I exclude bivaluational semantic
constructions as necessarily bivalent (in my sense).5 Moreover, Béziau
toys with the principle of excluded middle (EM, for brevity). First of
all, it is not always suﬃciently clear whether he appeals to its logical
or metalogical version, as both versions appear in his considerations.
Furthermore, Béziau oﬀers a non-standard formulation of the principle
in question, namely
(EM) A sentence A and its negation cannot be both false.
Béziau argues that (1) does not entails (EM), because there is a bivalua-
tion ascribing 0 to A as well as to ¬A. An answer to this argument points
out that (i)–(iv) do not impose truth-conditions for connectives. Yet
the classical bivalent semantics as contrasted with various bivaluations
deﬁnes the functor of negation in the manner used in (1).
The paraconsistent case is perhaps particularly interesting. Doubt-
less, paraconsistent semantics obeys (i)–(iv). The third condition al-
lows that both A and ¬A can have the value 1 in some paraconsistent
systems or the value 0 in other systems. The ﬁrst case concerns so-
called dialetheias (contradictory statements which are both true), but
the second case tolerates anti-dialetheias (the name is ad hoc), that is,
ascribes falsehood to both mutual contradictories.6 Moreover, we can
designate T (or F, if one likes), deﬁne a non-explosive consequence op-
eration and determine a sound “bivalent” logic (the quotes here will be
explained in a moment). However, there are some survey problems to
be tackled. First of all, dialetheias (and anti-dialetheias as well) cannot
be generally generated, but arise only from very special cases. These
are, for instance, the Russell sentence about sets which are not their
own elements, the Liar sentences, etc. One can ask what is a diﬀerence
between such sentences and “normal” contradictories. Secondly, I did
not ﬁnd any natural matrix semantics for paraconsistent logic.7 Hence,
properties of connectives are somehow vague or even mysterious. For
5 See Caleiro, Carnielli, Coniglio and Marcos 2007 for a very sophisticated ac-
count of dyadic (bivaluational) semantics. However, constructions presented in this
paper seem to be based on the distinction of designted and non-designated values.
6 Dialetheieas and anti-dialetheias are someitems called truth-value gluts.
7 Compare for instance Béziau, Carnielli, and Gabbay 2007 or Priest and Tanaka
2009.
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instance, the negation in discussive logic is classical, but the negation in
one of Béziau’s examples is not. Thirdly, the relation of paraconsistent
logic to many-valued logic is not clear. Some logicians (see Priest and
Tanaka 2009 for further information) regard many-valueness as the best
way to explain paraconsistency, but other tend to search for diﬀerent
solutions. Fourthly and more speciﬁcally, it is very unclear how the T-
scheme should be understood if we insert dialetheias (or anti-dialetheias)
in it. In the former case, it is very problematic whether paraconsistency
obeys the principles of bivalent semantics, but if the latter direction
is taken, the issue appears to be open. These arguments justify the
hypothesis that paraconsistency is bivalent if and only if it is bivalua-
tional. In fact, although bivalence leads to a bivaluation, the reverse
dependency does not generally hold. Let me add that my critical re-
marks about paraconsistent logic are not intended as oﬀering arguments
against formal studies on consistency, its sources, scope and limitations.
All I wanted was to show why the standard concept of bivalence should
not be extended beyond classical logic.
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